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Abstract
The GAI (Generalized Additive Independence) model proposed by Fishburn is
a generalization of the additive utility model, which need not satisfy mutual prefer-
ential independence. Its great generality makes however its application and study
difficult. We consider a significant subclass of GAI models, namely the discrete
2-additive GAI models, and provide for this class a decomposition into nonneg-
ative monotone terms. This decomposition allows a reduction from exponential
to quadratic complexity in any optimization problem involving discrete 2-additive
models, making them usable in practice.
Keywords: multiattribute utility theory, capacity, generalized additive independence,
multichoice game
1 Introduction
The theory of multiattribute utility (MAUT) provides an adequate and widely studied
framework for the representation of preferences in decision making with multiple objec-
tives or criteria (let us mention here only the classic works of Keeney and Raiffa (1976),
and Krantz et al. (1971) on conjoint measurement, among numerous other ones). The
most representative models in MAUT are the additive utility model U(x) =
∑
i ui(xi),
and the multiplicative model (see Dyer and Sarin (1979)), whose characteristic property
is the (mutual) preferential independence, stipulating that the preference among two
alternatives should not depend on the attributes where the two alternatives agree (see
Abbas and Sun (2015) for a detailed study on MAUT models satisfying preferential in-
dependence).
∗Corresponding author.
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However, it is well known that in real situations, preferential independence could be
easily violated, because of the possible interaction between objective/criteria. Referring
to the example of evaluation of students in Grabisch (1996) where students are eval-
uated on three subjects like mathematics, physics and language skills, the preference
between two students may be inverted depending on their level in mathematics, assum-
ing that the evaluation policy pays attention to scientific subjects. For instance, the
following preference reversal is not unlikely (marks are given on a 0-100 scale, in the
following order: mathematics, physics and language skills): (40, 90, 60) ≻ (40, 60, 90) and
(80, 90, 60) ≺ (80, 60, 90), because if a student is weak in one of the scientific subject (e.g.,
40 in mathematics), more attention is paid to the other scientific subject (here, physics),
otherwise more attention is paid to language skills.
To escape preferential independence, Krantz et al. (1971) have proposed the so-called
decomposable model, of the form U(x) = F (u1(x1), . . . , un(xn)), where F is strictly mono-
tone. This model, which is a generalization of the additive utility model, is characterized
by a much weaker property than preferential independence, namely weak independence
or weak separability (Wakker (1989)). This property amounts to requiring preferential in-
dependence only for one attribute versus the others, and is generally satisfied in practice.
Taking F as the Choquet integral w.r.t. a capacity (Choquet (1953)) permits to have
a versatile model, which has been well studied and applied in practice (see a survey in
Grabisch and Labreuche (2010)). The drawback of these models is that in general they
require commensurate utility functions, i.e., one should be able to compare ui(xi) with
uj(xj) for every distinct i, j.
Another generalization of the additive utility model escaping preferential indepen-
dence has been proposed by Fishburn (1967), under the name of generalized additive
independence (GAI) model. It has the general form U(x) =
∑
S∈S uS(xS), where S is
any collection of subsets of attributes, and xS is the vector of components of x belonging
to S. This model is very general (it even need not satisfy weak independence, see below
for an example) and does not need commensurate attributes.
Its great generality is also the Achille’s heel of this model, making it difficult to use in
practice, and so far it has not been so much considered in the MAUT community. Some
developments, essentially focused on the identification of the parameters of the model,
have been done in the field of artificial intelligence (see, e.g., Bacchus and Grove (1995);
Boutilier et al. (2001); Bigot et al. (2012)). There are two major difficulties related to
this model.
Firstly, its expression is far from being unique. In two equivalent decompositions
U(x) =
∑
S∈S uS(xS) =
∑
S∈S u
′
S(xS), the utility functions uS and u
′
S may behave com-
pletely differently and in particular be governed by different monotonicity conditions.
This implies that there is no intrinsic semantics attached to these utility terms, which
makes the model difficult to interpret for the decision maker.
The second difficulty is related to its elicitation, because the number of monotonicity
constraints on the parameters of the model grows exponentially fast in the number of
attributes. As these constraints must be enforced, the practical identification of the
model appears to be rapidly computationally intractable as the number of attributes and
the cardinality of the attributes grow.
The aim of this paper is to provide a first step in making GAI models usable in
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practice, by proving a fundamental result on decomposition, in a subclass of GAI models
which is significant for applications. Specifically, we are interested in GAI models where,
first, the collection S is made only of singletons and pairs, thus limiting the model to a
sum of univariate or bivariate terms, and second, the attributes take discrete values. We
call this particular class 2-additive discrete GAI models. In addition, we assume that
weak independence holds.
The main result of this paper shows that for a given 2-additive GAI model that fulfills
weak independence, it is always possible to obtain a decomposition into nonnegative
monotone nondecreasing terms. The result is proved by using an equivalence between 2-
additive discrete GAI models and 2-additive k-ary capacities, and amounts to finding the
set of extreme points of the polytope of 2-additive k-ary capacities. Going back to the first
difficulty mentioned earlier, using this decomposition provides a semantics to the utility
terms uS as they have the same monotonicity as the overall utility U . Secondly, thanks
to this result, it is possible to replace the monotonicity conditions on U by monotonicity
conditions on each term uS, which reduces the number of monotonicity constraints from
exponential to quadratic complexity. This is of extreme importance in practice.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary concepts and
notation in multiattribute utility, capacities, k-ary capacities, and GAI models. Section 3
introduces p-additive GAI models, and shows the equivalence with p-additive k-ary ca-
pacities. Section 4 explains the complexity problem behind the identification of 2-additive
discrete GAI models, and proves that a decomposition into nonnegative monotone non-
decreasing terms is always possible, which constitutes the main result of the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
We consider n attributes X1, . . . , Xn, letting N = {1, . . . , n} be its index set. Alternatives
are represented by a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) in X = X1 × · · · × Xn. We denote by
(xA, y−A) ∈ X the compound alternative taking value xi if i ∈ A and value yi otherwise.
One of the leading model in decision theory is Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (Keeney and Raiffa,
1976). The overall utility U : X → R representing the preference relation < of a decision
maker (i.e. x < y iff U(x) ≥ U(y)) is then supposed to satisfy preferential independence,
whereby the comparison between two alternatives does not depend on the attributes
having the same value. Accordingly, U can take the form of either an additive model
U(x) =
∑
i∈N ki ui(xi), or a multiplicative form 1−k U(x) =
∏
i∈N (1−k ki ui(xi)), where
ui is a marginal utility function over attribute Xi.
As we explained in the introduction, preferential independence is quite a strong con-
dition which is not always met in practice. A weaker condition is weak independence
where for all i ∈ N , all xi, yi ∈ Xi and all z−i, t−i ∈ X−i
(xi, z−i) < (yi, z−i) ⇐⇒ (xi, t−i) < (yi, t−i)
(xi is at least as good as yi ceteris paribus). Under this condition, we can define a
preference relation <i on a single attribute Xi as follows: for all xi, yi ∈ Xi
xi <i yi iff (xi, z−i) < (yi, z−i),
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for some z−i ∈ X−i.
2.2 Generalized Additive Independence (GAI) model
The additive utility model
∑
i∈N ui(xi) can be easily generalized by considering marginal
utility functions over subsets of attributes, with potential overlap between the subsets
(Fishburn, 1967; Bacchus and Grove, 1995):
U(x) =
∑
S∈S
uS(xS) (x ∈ X), (1)
where S ⊆ 2N \ {∅}. This model is called the Generalized Additive Independence (GAI)
model. It is characterized by a condition stating that if two probability distributions
P and Q over the alternatives X have the same marginals over every S ∈ S, then the
expected utility of P and Q are equal. The additive utility model is a particular case of
the GAI model when S is composed of singletons only.
Unlike the additive utility model or the multiplicative model, the GAI model does
not necessarily satisfy weak independence. In the Artificial Intelligence community, re-
searchers are interested in the representation of preferences that may violate weak in-
dependence. A well-known example of such a preference is the following: consider two
attributes X1, X2 where X1 pertains on the type of wine and X2 to the type of main
course in a restaurant. Then usually, one prefers ‘red wine’ to ‘white wine’ if the main
course is ‘meat’, but ‘white wine’ is preferred to ‘red wine’ if the main course is ‘fish’ (the
preference over attribute ‘wine’ is conditional on the value on attribute ‘main course’)
(Boutilier et al., 2001).
In this work, we follow a more traditional view of Decision Theory and assume that
weak independence holds, which is the case in most of the decision problems.
We make the following two assumptions:
• Assumption 1: Monotonicity:
∀i ∈ N, xi <i yi ⇒ U(x) ≥ U(y)
• Assumption 2: Boundaries: each Xi is bounded, in the sense that there exist
x⊤i , x
⊥
i ∈ Xi which are the best and worst elements of Xi according to <i, and
U(x⊤i , . . . , x
⊤
n ) = 1, U(x
⊥
i , . . . , x
⊥
n ) = 0.
2.3 Non-uniqueness of the GAI decomposition
In the additive utility model, considering two possible decompositions U(x) =
∑
i∈N ui(xi) =∑
i∈N u
′
i(xi), ui and u
′
i are equal up to a constant (Fishburn, 1965), so that all admis-
sible utility functions satisfy the same monotonicity (for any two xi, yi ∈ Xi, we have
ui(xi) ≥ ui(yi) iff u
′
i(xi) ≥ u
′
i(yi)).
Concerning the GAI model, taking two equivalent decompositions U(x) =
∑
S∈S uS(xS) =∑
S∈S u
′
S(xS), they are related by (Fishburn, 1967)
u′S(xS) = uS(xS) +
∑
S′∈S\{S}, S∩S′ 6=∅
fS,S′(xS∩S′) + cS
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where fS,S′ : XS∩S′ → R, and
∑
S∈S
[∑
S′∈S\{S}, S∩S′ 6=∅ fS,S′(xS∩S′) + cS
]
= 0. Due to
the presence of functions fS,S′, we do not have uS(xS) ≥ uS(yS) iff u
′
S(xS) ≥ u
′
S(yS),
for any two xS, yS ∈ XS (Braziunas, 2012, page 87). Moreover, even if U satisfies weak
independence, it might be the case that uS does not fulfill this condition, or satisfies it
but does not have the same monotonicity as U . Hence there is no well-defined semantics
of the utility functions uS, contrarily to what is claimed in (Braziunas, 2012, section
3.2.1.4).
Braziunas proposes a decomposition based on the Fishburn representation. Fixing an
order on S, say, S = {S1, . . . , Sp}, the overall utility reads U(x) =
∑
S∈S u
C
S (xS) with,
for every j ∈ {1, . . . , p}
uCSj(xSj ) = U(x[Sj ]) +
∑
K⊆{1,...,j−1} , K 6=∅
(−1)|K|U (x [∩k∈KSk ∩ Sj]) (2)
where ·C stands for “canonical”, O ∈ X is any element in X seen as an anchor, and
x[S] ∈ X defined by (x[S])i = xi if i ∈ S and (x[S])i = Oi otherwise (Braziunas, 2012,
page 94)). Note that the expression depends on the chosen ordering of the elements of S.
Example 1. Consider the following function U(x1, x2, x3) = x2+x1x3+max(x1, x2). We
have S = {S1, S2, S3} with S1 = {2}, S2 = {1, 3} and S3 = {1, 2}. Then the canonical
decomposition gives, with O = (0, 0, 0):
uCS1(x2) = U(x[S1]) = U(O1, x2,O3) = 2 x2
uCS2(x1, x3) = U(x[S2])− U(x[S1 ∩ S2]) = U(x1,O2, x3)− U(O) = x1 (x3 + 1)
uCS3(x1, x2) = U(x[S3])− U(x[S1 ∩ S3])− U(x[S2 ∩ S3]) + U(x[S1 ∩ S2 ∩ S3])
= U(x1, x2,O3)− U(O1, x2,O3)− U(x1,O2,O3) + U(O)
= max(x1, x2)− x1 − x2 = −min(x1, x2)
We note that U is nondecreasing in all variables, even though, for the canonical decom-
position, uCS3 is nonincreasing in its two coordinates.
2.4 Capacities and k-ary capacities
We consider a finite set N = {1, . . . , n} (e.g., the index set of attributes as in Section 2.1).
A game on N is a set function v : 2N → R vanishing on the empty set. A game v is
monotone if v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . Note that monotone games take nonnegative
values, and if in addition v(N) = 1, the game is said to be normalized. In the sequel,
we will mainly deal with monotone normalized games, which are usually called capacities
(Choquet, 1953)1.
Making the identification of sets with their characteristic functions, i.e., S ↔ 1S
for any S ∈ 2N , with 1S : N → {0, 1}, 1S(i) = 1 iff i ∈ S, games can be seen as
functions on the set of binary functions. A natural generalization is then to consider
functions taking values in {0, 1, . . . , k}, leading to the so-called multichoice or k-choice
games (Hsiao and Raghavan, 1990) and k-ary capacities (Grabisch and Labreuche, 2003).
1Often capacities are defined as monotone games, not necessarily normalized.
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Formally, a k-choice game is a mapping v : {0, 1, . . . , k}N → R satisfying v(0, . . . , 0) = 0.
A k-ary capacity is a k-choice game being monotone and normalized, i.e., satisfying
v(y) ≤ v(z) whenever y ≤ z, and v(k, . . . , k) = 1.
Let v : 2N → R be a game. The Mo¨bius transform of v (a.k.a. Mo¨bius inverse) is the
set function mv : 2N → R which is the (unique) solution of the linear system
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S
mv(T ) (S ∈ 2N)
(see Rota (1964)). It is given by
mv(S) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S\T |v(T ) (S ∈ 2N). (3)
A capacity v is said to be (at most) p-additive for some p ∈ {1, . . . , n} if its Mo¨bius
transform vanishes for subsets of more than p elements: mv(S) = 0 for all S ⊆ N such
that |S| > p.
Similarly, given a k-ary game v, its Mo¨bius transform is defined as the unique solution
of the linear system
v(z) =
∑
y≤z
mv(y) (z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}N). (4)
It is shown in the appendix that its solution is given by
mv(z) =
∑
y≤z : zi−yi≤1∀i∈N
(−1)
∑
i∈N (zi−yi)v(y) (z ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}N). (5)
It follows that any k-ary game v can be written as:
v =
∑
x∈LN
mv(x)ux,
with ux a k-ary capacity defined by
ux(z) =
{
1, if z ≥ x
0, otherwise.
By analogy with classical games, ux is called the unanimity game centered on x. Note
that this decomposition is unique as the unanimity games are linearly independent, and
form a basis of the vector space of k-ary games.
3 Relation between GAI and k-ary capacities
3.1 Discrete GAI models are k-ary capacities
We consider discrete GAI models, i.e., where attributes can take only a finite number of
values, and show that they are particular instances of k-ary capacities. We put
Xi = {a
0
i , . . . , a
mi
i } (i ∈ N),
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with a0i 4i · · · 4i a
mi
i . Any alternative x ∈ X is mapped to {0, . . . , m1}×· · ·×{0, . . . , mn}
by the mapping ϕ which simply keeps track of the rank of the value of the attribute:
(aj11 , . . . , a
jn
n ) 7→ ϕ(a
j1
1 , . . . , a
jn
n ) = (j1, . . . , jn).
We consider now the smallest (discrete) hypercube {0, . . . , k}N containing {0, . . . , m1}×
· · · × {0, . . . , mn}, with k := maximi. Given a GAI model U with discrete attributes as
described above, we define the mapping v : {0, . . . , k}N → R by
U(x) =: v(ϕ(x)) (x ∈ X)
and let v(z) := v(m1, . . . , mn) when z ∈ {0, . . . , k}
N \ ϕ(X). In words, v encodes the
values of U for every alternative, and fills in the missing values in the hypercube by the
maximum of U . By assumption 1 and 2 on U , it follows that v is a normalized k-ary
capacity on N .
From now on, we put L = {0, 1, . . . , k}.
3.2 p-additive GAI models
Consider a GAI model U on X , where the attributes need not be discrete. As U is
in general exponentially complex in the number of attributes, one is looking for simple
particular cases. The simplest case would be to consider a classical additive model. The
characteristic property of an additive model is that the variation of U in one attribute is
unrelated to the value of the other fixed ones:
U(yi, x−i)− U(xi, x−i) = u{i}(yi)− u{i}(xi).
Calling the left member the (1st order) variation of U w.r.t. i from xi to yi at x, we
define inductively the variation of U w.r.t. P ⊆ N from xP to yP at x by
∆yPxPU(x) =
∑
T⊆P
(−1)|P\T |U(yT , xP\T , x−P )
For example, one has, abbreviating {i, j} by ij:
∆yixiU(x) = U(yi, x−i)− U(xi, x−i)
∆yijxijU(x) = U(yij , x−ij)− U(xi, yj, x−ij)− U(yi, xj , x−ij) + U(x).
Definition 1. A function U on X is said to be p-additive for some p ∈ {1, . . . , n} if for
every P ⊆ N with |P | ≤ p, for every x ∈ X , xP , yP ∈ XP and x
′
−P ∈ X−P ,
∆yPxPU(xP , x−P ) = ∆
yP
xP
U(xP , x
′
−P ).
The above definition generalizes the notion of 2-additivity proposed in Labreuche and Grabisch
(2013).
The next theorem relates p-additivity to the decomposition of U into terms involving
at most p variables, and generalizes (Labreuche and Grabisch, 2013, Prop. 4).
Theorem 1. A function U on X is p-additive for some p ∈ {1, . . . , n} if and only if there
exist functions uA : XA → R, for every A ⊆ N with |A| ≤ p, such that U takes the form
(1) with S = {A ⊆ N, 0 < |A| ≤ p}.
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Proof. We suppose p 6= n to discard the trivial case. The “if” part is easy to check.
As for the “only if” part, fix x ∈ X and define v(A) = U(xA, 0−A) for all A ⊆ N . By
assumptions 1 and 2, v is a (nonnormalized) capacity on N . Define its discrete derivative
inductively as follows. For any ∅ 6= S ⊂ N , T ∈ 2N and i 6∈ S,
∆S∪iv(T ) = ∆i(∆Sv(T ))
with ∆iv(T ) = v(T ∪ i)− v(T ). Then it is easy to see by (3) that ∆Sv(∅) = m
v(S), and
that for disjoint S and T
∆Sv(T ) = ∆
xS
0S
U(xT , 0−T ).
Take S such that |S| = p and any i ∈ N \ S. Then for any T ⊆ N \ (S ∪ i),
∆S∪iv(T ) = ∆i(∆Sv(T )) = ∆
xS
0S
U(xT∪i, 0−T∪i)−∆
xS
0S
U(xT , 0−T ) = 0
by assumption of p-additivity of U . Letting T = ∅, it follows that v is p-additive too (in
the sense of capacities), hence we can write:
U(x) = v(N) =
∑
S⊆N,0<|S|≤p
mv(S)
with mv(S) = ∆Sv(∅) = ∆
xS
0S
U(0). Since the latter term only depends on the variables
xS, the desired result follows.
3.3 p-additive k-ary capacities
By analogy with classical capacities, a k-ary capacity v is said to be (at most) p-additive
if mv(z) = 0 whenever |supp(z)| > p, where
supp(z) = {i ∈ N | zi > 0}.
Lemma 1. Let k ∈ N and p ∈ {1, . . . , n}. A k-ary game v is p-additive if and only if it
has the form
v(z) =
∑
x∈LN ,0<|supp(x)|≤p
vx(x ∧ z) (z ∈ L
N ) (6)
where vx : L
N → R with vx(0) = 0.
Proof. Suppose that v is p-additive. By the decomposition of v in the basis of unanimity
games, it follows that
v =
∑
x∈LN ,0<|supp(x)|≤p
mv(x)ux,
hence we have the required form with vx = m
v(x)ux. Conversely, again by decomposition
in the basis of unanimity games and since vx is a game, (6) can be rewritten as:∑
y∈LN
mv(y)uy(z) =
∑
x∈LN ,0<|supp(x)|≤p
∑
y∈LN
mvx(y)uy(x ∧ z)
=
∑
y∈LN ,0<|supp(y)|≤p
∑
x∈LN ,0<|supp(x)|≤p
mvx(y)uy(x ∧ z)
=
∑
y∈LN ,0<|supp(y)|≤p
( ∑
x≥y,0<|supp(x)|≤p
mvx(y)
)
uy(z).
By uniqueness of the decomposition, it follows that v is p-additive.
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Note that even if v is a capacity, the vx are not necessarily capacities.
It follows from Theorem 1 and the above result that the set of p-additive discrete GAI
models on X coincides with the set of (at most) p-additive k-ary capacities.
4 Monotone decomposition of a 2-additive GAI model
4.1 A complexity problem
We have seen in Section 2.3 that the GAI decomposition is not unique. Moreover, the
terms in two equivalent GAI decompositions may have different monotonicity conditions,
as shown in Example 1. Then the following question arises: Given a GAI model, is it
always possible to get a decomposition into nonnegative nondecreasing terms? The main
result of this paper will give a positive answer to this question, in the case of 2-additive
GAI models. This case is of particular importance in practice, since it constitutes a
good compromise between versatility and complexity. Experimental studies in multicri-
teria evaluation have shown that 2-additive capacities have almost the same approxi-
mation ability than general capacities (see, e.g., Grabisch et al. (2002)). A two-additive
GAI model is considered in Bigot et al. (2012), and a very similar model is defined in
Greco et al. (2014).
Before stating and proving the result, we explain why it is important to solve this
problem, which is related to the complexity of the model.
We begin by computing the number of unknowns in a 2-additive GAI model equivalent
to a k-ary capacity. By Theorem 1, such a model has the form (1) with S being the set
of singletons and pairs. Since |L| = k + 1, this yields
(k + 1)
(
n
1
)
+ (k + 1)2
(
n
2
)
=
n(k + 1)
2
(
2 + (k + 1)(n− 1)
)
unknowns. U being monotone nondecreasing, this induces a number of monotonicity
constraints on the unknowns, of the type
U(aj11 , . . . , a
ji−1
i−1 , a
ji+1
i , a
ji+1
i+1 , . . . , a
jn
n ) ≥ U(a
j1
1 , . . . , a
ji−1
i−1 , a
ji
i , a
ji+1
i+1 , . . . , a
jn
n ) (7)
for every i ∈ N , j1 ∈ {0, . . . , m1}, . . . , ji−1 ∈ {0, . . . , mi−1}, ji ∈ {0, . . . , mi − 1}, ji+1 ∈
{0, . . . , mi+1},. . . ,jn ∈ {0, . . . , mn}. The number of elementary conditions contained in
(7) is equal to ∑
i∈N
(
mi ×
∏
j∈N\{i}
(mj + 1)
)
.
In the case where mi = k for every i, this number becomes
n× k × (k + 1)n−1.
Although the number of variables was still quadratic in n and k, the number of constraints
is exponential in n. It follows that any practical identification of a GAI model based on
some optimization procedure2, where the variables are the unknowns of the GAI model
2The learning problem can be classically transformed into a linear program, where the training set
is seen as linear constraints on the GAI variables (Bigot et al., 2012; Greco et al., 2014). It could also
be possible to perform statistical learning, like in Fallah Tehrani et al. (2012), where the underlying
optimization problem is a convex problem under linear constraints.
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and the constraints are the monotonicity constraints (7) plus possibly some learning data,
has to cope with an exponential number of constraints. The following tables, obtained
with k = 4, shows that the underlying optimization problem becomes rapidly intractable.
n 4 6 8 10
♯ of variables 170 405 740 1175
♯ of constraints 2000 75 000 2 500 000 78 125 000
n 12 14 20
♯ of variables 1710 2345 4850
♯ of constraints 2 343 750 000 68 359 375 000 1.526E + 15
However, if a decomposition into nonnegative nondecreasing terms is possible, one has
only to check monotonicity of each term. Then the number of monotonicity conditions
drops to ∑
i∈N
mi +
∑
{i,j}⊆N
(
mi(mj + 1) +mj(mi + 1)
)
.
In the case where mi = k for every i, this number becomes
n× k ×
[
(n− 1)(k + 1) + 1
]
,
which is quadratic in n. The following table (k = 4) shows that the optimization problem
becomes tractable even for a large number of attributes.
n 4 6 8 10 12 14 20
♯ of constraints with
monotone decomposition
256 624 1152 1840 2688 3696 7680
4.2 The main result
The following theorem states that a decomposition of a 2-additive GAI model into mono-
tone nondecreasing terms is always possible.
Theorem 2. Let us consider a 2-additive discrete GAI model U satisfying assumptions 1
and 2. Then there exist nonnegative and nondecreasing functions ui : Xi → [0, 1], i ∈ N ,
uij : Xi ×Xj → [0, 1], {i, j} ⊆ N , such that
U(x) =
∑
i∈N
ui(xi) +
∑
{i,j}⊆N
uij(xi, xj) (x ∈ X)
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of this theorem, which goes through a
number of intermediary results. First, we remark that the problem is equivalent to the
decomposition of a 2-additive k-ary capacity v into a sum of 2-additive k-ary capacities
whose support has size at most 2, where the support of v is defined by
supp(v) =
⋃
x∈LN :mv(x)6=0
supp(x).
We consider Pk,· the polytope of k-ary capacities, and Pk,2 the polytope of 2-additive
k-ary capacities. Our aim is to study the vertices of the latter, and we will show that
these vertices are the adequate k-ary capacities to perform the decomposition.
A first easy fact is that the extreme points of Pk,· are the 0-1-valued k-ary capacities.
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Lemma 2. vˆ is an extreme point of Pk,· iff vˆ is 0-1-valued.
Proof. Take vˆ in Pk,· which is 0-1-valued, and consider v, v
′ ∈ Pk,· such that
v+v′
2
= vˆ.
Then, since vˆ is 0-1-valued,
v(x) + v′(x) =
{
2, if vˆ(x) = 1
0, otherwise.
Since v, v′ are normalized and monotone, the only possibility to get v(x)+ v′(x) = 2 is to
have v(x) = v′(x) = 1, and similarly, v(x) + v′(x) = 0 forces v(x) = v′(x) = 0. It follows
that v = v′ = vˆ, i.e., vˆ is an extreme point of Pk,·.
Conversely, consider a vertex vˆ which is not 0-1-valued, and let
ǫ = min(1− max
x:vˆ(x)<1
vˆ(x), min
x:vˆ(x)>0
vˆ(x)).
Define
v′(x) = vˆ(x) + ǫ, for all x s.t. vˆ(x) 6= 0, 1
v′′(x) = vˆ(x)− ǫ, for all x s.t. vˆ(x) 6= 0, 1,
and v′ = v′′ = vˆ otherwise. Then v′, v′′ ∈ Pk,· and vˆ =
v′+v′′
2
, a contradiction.
Lemma 3. Let k ∈ N and v ∈ Pk,2. Then v is 0-1-valued iff m
v is {−1, 0, 1} valued.
Proof. ⇐) By the assumption
∑
y≤xm
v(y) ∈ Z for every x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}N . Since
v ∈ Pk,2 it follows that v is 0-1-valued.
⇒) Assume v is 0-1-valued and use (5) to compute the Mo¨bius transform. For z = ℓi
with ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we have mv(z) = v(ℓi)− v((ℓ− 1)i), so that the desired result holds.
Otherwise z = ℓiℓ
′
j with ℓ, ℓ
′ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and distinct i, j ∈ N . Then
mv(z) = v(z)− v((ℓ− 1)iℓ
′
j)− v(ℓi(ℓ
′ − 1)j) + v((ℓ− 1)i(ℓ
′ − 1)j). (8)
By the assumption and monotonicity of v, it follows that mv(z) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
We recall that a m × n matrix is totally unimodular if the determinant of every
square submatrix is equal to −1, 0 or 1. A polyhedron is integer if all its extreme points
have integer coordinates. Then a matrix A is totally unimodular iff the polyhedron
{x | Ax ≤ b} is integer for every integer vector b. In particular it is known that the
vertex-arc matrix M of a directed graph, i.e., whose entries are Mx,a = 1 if the arc a
leaves vertex x, −1 if a enters x, and 0 otherwise, is totally unimodular (in other words,
each column of M has exactly one +1 and one −1, the rest being 0).
We are now in position to characterize the extreme points of Pk,2.
Theorem 3. Let k ∈ N. The set of extreme points of Pk,2, the polytope of 2-additive
k-ary capacities, is the set of 0-1-valued 2-additive k-ary capacities.
Proof. By Lemma 2, we need only to prove that any extreme point of Pk,2 is 0-1-valued.
1. We prove that Ak,·, the matrix defining the polytope of k-ary capacities, is totally
unimodular. The argument follows the one given for classical capacities by Miranda et
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al. (Miranda et al., 2006, Th. 2). We prove that A⊤k,· is totally unimodular, which is
equivalent to the desired result. Since the monotonicity constraints are either of the form
v(1i) ≥ 0 or v(x) − v(x
′) ≥ 0 where x′ is a lower neighbor of x (i.e. x′ = x − 1i for
some i), the matrix A⊤k.· has the form (I, B), where I is a submatrix of the (k
n − 1)-dim
identity matrix Ikn−1, and B is a matrix where each column has exactly one +1 and one
−1. Hence B is totally unimodular, and so is (Ikn−1, B) as it easy to check. Since A
⊤
k,· is
a submatrix of it, it is also totally unimodular.
2. It follows from Step 1 that the polytope Pk,·(b) given by Ak,·v ≤ b is integer for
every integer vector b. Next, consider the (kn−1)×(kn−1)-matrix Z expressing the Zeta
transform, i.e., Zmv = v, as given by (4). This matrix has only 0 and 1 as entries, and
its inverse Z−1 exists and its entries are 0,−1,+1 only (see (5)). Consider the polytope
Pmk,·(b) given by A
m
k,·m ≤ b with A
m
k,· = Ak,·Z, the image by the linear transform Z of the
polytope Pk,·(b). It is easy to check that vˆ is an extreme point of Pk,·(b) iff Z
−1vˆ is an
extreme point of Pmk,·(b). Evidently, the coordinates of Z
−1vˆ are integer, therefore Pmk,·(b)
is integer for every integer vector b. We conclude that Amk,· is totally unimodular.
3. Inasmuch as a submatrix of a totally unimodular matrix is itself totally unimodular,
it follows from Step 2 that Amk,2, the matrix defining the set of 2-additive k-ary capacities
in Mo¨bius coordinates, is also totally unimodular. As a conclusion, the extreme points
of Pmk,2 are integer-valued.
4. We show that the extreme points of Pmk,2 are {−1, 0, 1}-valued. Then Lemma 3
permits to conclude. It suffices to show that |mv(z)| ≥ 2 cannot happen. If z = ℓi with
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we find by (5) that mv(z) = v(ℓi) − v((ℓ − 1)i), so that the claim holds
since v ∈ Pk,2. Otherwise, z = ℓiℓ
′
j with ℓ, ℓ
′ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and distinct i, j, and mv(z) is
given by (8). Since v is monotone and normalized, the claim easily follows.
The last step is to prove that a 0-1-valued 2-additive k-ary capacity has a support of
size at most 2.
Theorem 4. Consider a 2-additive k-ary capacity u on N which is 0-1-valued. Then the
support of u is restricted to at most two attributes.
Proof. Preliminary Step. u being 2-additive, its expression is
u(x) =
∑
{i,j}⊆N
ui,j(xi, xj) (x ∈ X). (9)
If we set u′i,j(xi, xj) = ui,j(xi, xj) − ui,j(0, 0), we obtain u(x) =
∑
{i,j}⊆N u
′
i,j(xi, xj) + C,
where C = −
∑
{i,j}⊆N ui,j(0, 0). By assumption 2 and u
′
i,j(0, 0) = 0, one gets C = 0.
This proves that in decomposition (9), one can always assume that
∀{i, j} ⊆ N ui,j(0, 0) = 0. (10)
We wish to prove that u depends only on one term ui,j in (9). In order to avoid cases
where such a term ui,j depends only on one variable (in which case u might also depend
on another term uk,l), we are interested in terms ui,j depending on its two variables xi
and xj . We say that ui,j depends on its two variables if
∃yi ∈ Xi ∃yj ∈ Xj ui,j(yi, yj) 6= ui,j(yi, 0) (11)
∃y′i ∈ Xi ∃y
′
j ∈ Xj ui,j(y
′
i, y
′
j) 6= ui,j(0, y
′
j) (12)
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Clearly, if (11) (resp. (12)) is not fulfilled, then ui,j does not depend on attribute xj
(resp. xi).
The proof is organized as follows. We show in Step 1 that if there is no term ui,j that
depends on its two variables, then u depends only on one variable. We then assume that
at least one term ui,j depends on its two variables – denoted u1,2 w.l.o.g. Step 2 shows
that it is not possible to have a non-zero term ui,j, with {i, j} ⊆ N \{1, 2}. Step 3 proves
that it is not possible to have a non-zero term ui,j, with i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ N \ {1, 2}.
We conclude that u1,2 is the only non-zero term in the decomposition. This proves that
u depends only on two variables.
Step 1: case of the additive utility model. We first start with the case where
there is no term ui,j that depends on its two variables.
Lemma 4. Assume that there is no term ui,j that depends on its two variables. Then
the support of u is restricted to one attribute.
Proof. If there is no term ui,j that depends on its two variables, u takes the form of an
additive utility:
u(x) =
∑
i∈N
ui(xi)
where ui : Xi → R is not necessarily nonnegative or monotone. By (10), we have ui(0) = 0
for every i ∈ N .
Let i ∈ N , we write u(xi, 0−i) = ui(xi). Hence ui is 0-1-valued and monotone.
As u is not constant by Assumption 2, at least one term ui is not constant. W.l.o.g.
let us assume it is u1. Then there exists x1 ∈ X1 such that u1(x1) = 1.
Now for every i ∈ N\{1} and xi ∈ Xi, u(x1, xi, 0−1,i) = 1+ui(xi). As ui is nonnegative
and u is 0-1-valued, we conclude that ui(xi) = 0. Hence u depends only on x1.
Step 2: Case where u has two non-zero terms with non-overlapping sup-
port, e.g., u1,2 and u3,4. We now focus on the situation where at least one term ui,j
depends on its two variables. W.l.o.g., we assume it is u1,2.
We consider the general case where there are at least 4 attributes. The restriction
with only 3 attributes will be handled in Step 3. For every j ∈ N \ {1, 2}, we choose
k(j) ∈ N \{1, 2, j} (where k(j) 6= k(j′) for j 6= j′). For every i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ N \{1, 2},
we set
u′i,j(xi, xj) = ui,j(xi, xj)− ui,j(xi, 0)− ui,j(0, xj)
u′1,2(x1, x2) = u1,2(x1, x2) +
∑
j∈N\{1,2}
(u1,j(x1, 0) + u2,j(x2, 0))
u′j,k(j)(xj, xk(j)) = uj,k(j)(xj , xk(j)) + u1,j(0, xj) + u2,j(0, xj)
Then u(x) =
∑
{i,j}⊆N u
′
i,j(xi, xj). Moreover u
′
i,j(xi, 0) = 0 and u
′
i,j(0, xj) = 0 for i ∈
{1, 2}, j ∈ N \ {1, 2}, xi ∈ Xi and xj ∈ Xj . Hence in decomposition (9), we can assume
that
∀i ∈ {1, 2} ∀j ∈ N \{1, 2} ∀xi ∈ Xi ∀xj ∈ Xj ui,j(xi, 0) = 0 and ui,j(0, xj) = 0. (13)
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Thanks to (10) and (13), we have
u(x1, x2, 0−1,2) = u1,2(x1, x2) (14)
Hence
u1,2 is 0-1-valued and monotone. (15)
By (15), conditions (11) and (12) with i = 1, j = 2 give
u1,2(y1, y2) = 1 , u1,2(y1, 0) = 0
u1,2(y
′
1, y
′
2) = 1 , u1,2(0, y
′
2) = 0
(16)
Assume by contradiction that there exists a non-zero ui,j for some {i, j} ⊆ N \
{1, 2}. W.l.o.g., we assume it is u3,4. Then there exists z3 ∈ X3 and z4 ∈ X4 such that
u3,4(z3, z4) 6= 0. As for (13), we can transfer, for i ∈ {3, 4} and j ∈ N \ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the
term ui,j(xi, 0) in u3,4. Hence we can assume that
∀i ∈ {3, 4} ∀j ∈ N \ {1, 2, 3, 4} ∀xi ∈ Xi ui,j(xi, 0) = 0. (17)
Thanks to (10), (13) and (17), we have
u(x3, x4, 0−3,4) = u3,4(x3, x4) (18)
Hence
u3,4 is 0-1-valued, monotone, and u3,4(z3, z4) = 1. (19)
Lemma 5. If u1,2 depends on its two variables, then u3,4 is identically zero.
Proof. We set v(x1, x2, x3, x4) = u(x1, x2, x3, x4, 0−1,2,3,4). We write
v(x1, x2, x3, x4) =
∑
1≤i<j≤4
ui,j(xi, xj).
Analysis with y and z:
• v(y1, y2, z3, z4) = u1,2(y1, y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ u3,4(z3, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+
∑
i∈{1,2},j∈{3,4} ui,j(yi, zj). We have v(y1, y2, z3, z4) =
1 as v(y1, y2, z3, z4) ≥ v(y1, y2, 0, 0) = u1,2(y1, y2) = 1. Hence∑
i∈{1,2},j∈{3,4}
ui,j(yi, zj) = −1. (20)
• v(y1, y2, z3, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity
= 1 + u3,4(z3, 0) + u1,3(y1, z3) + u2,3(y2, z3). Hence
u3,4(z3, 0) + u1,3(y1, z3) + u2,3(y2, z3) = 0. (21)
• v(y1, y2, 0, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity
= 1 + u3,4(0, z4) + u1,4(y1, z4) + u2,4(y2, z4). Hence
u3,4(0, z4) + u1,4(y1, z4) + u2,4(y2, z4) = 0. (22)
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• v(y1, 0, z3, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity
= u1,2(y1, 0)+1+u1,3(y1, z3)+u1,4(y1, z4). Moreover, u1,2(y1, 0) = 0
by (16). Hence
u1,3(y1, z3) + u1,4(y1, z4) = 0. (23)
• v(0, y2, z3, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity
= u1,2(0, y2) + 1 + u2,3(y2, z3) + u2,4(y2, z4). Hence
u1,2(0, y2) + u2,3(y2, z3) + u2,4(y2, z4) = 0. (24)
• From (23), (24) and (20),
u1,2(0, y2) = 1. (25)
• v(0, y2, z3, 0) = u1,2(0, y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by (25)
+u3,4(z3, 0)+u2,3(y2, z3). Moreover, v(0, y2, z3, 0) ≥ v(0, y2, 0, 0) =
u1,2(0, y2) = 1. Hence
u3,4(z3, 0) + u2,3(y2, z3) = 0 and u2,3(y2, z3) ∈ {−1, 0}. (26)
• v(0, y2, 0, z4) = 1+u3,4(0, z4)+u2,4(y2, z4). Moreover, v(0, y2, 0, z4) ≥ v(0, y2, 0, 0) =
u1,2(0, y2) = 1. Hence
u3,4(0, z4) + u2,4(y2, z4) = 0 and u2,4(y2, z4) ∈ {−1, 0}. (27)
From (20) and (23), we get u2,3(y2, z3)+u2,4(y2, z4) = −1. As u2,3(y2, z3), u2,4(y2, z4) ∈
{−1, 0} (by (26) and (27)), we have two cases:
• Case 1: u2,3(y2, z3) = −1 and u2,4(y2, z4) = 0. Then
u3,4(z3, 0) = 1 by (26)
u1,3(y1, z3) = 0 by (21)
u1,4(y1, z4) = 0 by (23)
u1,2(y1, 0) = 0 by (16)
u1,2(0, y2) = 1 by (25)
u3,4(0, z4) = 0 by (27)
All values are determined.
• Case 2: u2,3(y2, z3) = 0 and u2,4(y2, z4) = −1. Then
u3,4(0, z4) = 1 by (27)
u3,4(z3, 0) = 0 by (26)
u1,3(y1, z3) = 0 by (21)
u1,4(y1, z4) = 0 by (22)
u1,2(y1, 0) = 0 by (16)
u1,2(0, y2) = 1 by (25)
All values are determined.
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Analysis with y′ and z: The analyses with y and z, and with y′ and z are similar. By
(16), we just need to invert the two attributes 1 and 2. Hence a similar reasoning to the
previous analysis can be done. We obtain thus the two cases 1′ and 2′ which are deduced
from cases 1 and 2 just by switching attributes 1 and 2:
• Case 1’:
u1,3(y
′
1, z3) = −1
u1,4(y
′
1, z4) = 0
u3,4(z3, 0) = 1
u2,3(y
′
2, z3) = 0
u2,4(y
′
2, z4) = 0
u1,2(y
′
1, 0) = 1
u1,2(0, y
′
2) = 0
u3,4(0, z4) = 0
• Case 2’:
u1,3(y
′
1, z3) = 0
u1,4(y
′
1, z4) = −1
u3,4(0, z4) = 1
u3,4(z3, 0) = 0
u2,3(y
′
2, z3) = 0
u2,4(y
′
2, z4) = 0
u1,2(y
′
1, 0) = 1
u1,2(0, y
′
2) = 0
Synthesis: Cases 1 and 2’ are incompatible, and so are cases 2 and 1’. We have thus the
alternative:
• Case 1 and 1’. Gathering the values of partial utilities, we get
u1,2(0, y2) = 1 u1,4(y
′
1, z4) = 0 u1,3(y
′
1, z3) = −1
u2,3(y2, z3) = −1 u2,4(y2, z4) = 0
As u1,2(y
′
1, y2) ≥ u1,2(0, y2) = 1, we have u1,2(y
′
1, y2) = 1. Hence
u(y′1, y2, z3, z4) = u1,2(y
′
1, y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ u3,4(z3, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ u1,3(y
′
1, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
+ u1,4(y
′
1, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ u2,3(y2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
+ u2,4(y2, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= 0
We obtain a contradiction as u(y′1, y2, z3, z4) ≥ u(0, 0, z3, z4) = 1.
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• Case 2 and 2’. Gathering the values of partial utilities, we get
u1,2(0, y2) = 1 u1,4(y
′
1, z4) = −1 u1,3(y
′
1, z3) = 0
u2,3(y2, z3) = 0 u2,4(y2, z4) = −1
As u1,2(y
′
1, y2) ≥ u1,2(0, y2) = 1, we have u1,2(y
′
1, y2) = 1. Hence
u(y′1, y2, z3, z4) = u1,2(y
′
1, y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ u3,4(z3, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+ u1,3(y
′
1, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ u1,4(y
′
1, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
+ u2,3(y2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+ u2,4(y2, z4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1
= 0
We obtain a contradiction as u(y′1, y2, z3, z4) ≥ u(0, 0, z3, z4) = 1.
A contradiction is raised in all situations. Hence it is not possible to have u3,4 non-zero,
knowing that u1,2 depends on its two variables.
Step 3: Case where u has two non-zero terms with overlapping support,
e.g., u1,2 and u1,3. In the last case, term u1,2 depends on its two variables, and there is
no non-zero term ui,j, with i, j 6= 1, 2, that depends on its two variables.
We proceed as in the beginning of Step 2, assuming that
∀i ∈ {1, 2} ∀j ∈ N \ {1, 2} ∀xi ∈ Xi ui,j(xi, 0) = 0. (28)
Then relations (14) through (16) also hold in this case.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a non-zero ui,j for some i ∈ {1, 2} and
j ∈ N \ {1, 2}. Wlog, we assume it is u1,3. There exists thus z1 ∈ X1 and z3 ∈ X3 such
that
u1,3(z1, z3) 6= 0. (29)
One can transfer term ui,3(0, x3), for i 6= 1, 3, to u1,3 (proceeding as in the beginning of
Step 2). Hence we can assume that
∀i ∈ N \ {1, 3} ∀x3 ∈ X3 ui,3(0, x3) = 0. (30)
Lemma 6. If u1,2 depends on its two variables, then u1,3 is identically zero.
Proof. We set v(x1, x2, x3) = u(x1, x2, x3, 0−1,2,3). Then
v(x1, x2, x3) = u1,2(x1, x2) + u1,3(x1, x3) + u2,3(x2, x3).
Analysis with y and z: We write thanks to (14) and to the monotonicity of v
v(z1, 0, z3) = u1,2(z1, 0) + u1,3(z1, z3)
≥ v(z1, 0, 0) = u1,2(z1, 0)
Hence u1,3(z1, z3) ≥ 0, which gives by (29)
u1,3(z1, z3) = 1 (31)
u1,2(z1, 0) = 0 (32)
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We have the following basic relations:
v(y1, 0, z3) = u1,2(y1, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+u1,3(y1, z3) (33)
v(y1, y2, z3) = 1 + u1,3(y1, z3) + u2,3(y2, z3) (34)
v(z1, y2, z3) = u1,2(z1, y2) + u1,3(z1, z3) + u2,3(y2, z3) (35)
Analysis with compound alternatives: We distinguish between two cases:
• Assume first that z1 ≥ y1. By (15) and (16), we have
u1,2(z1, y2) = 1. (36)
By monotonicity, v(z1, y2, z3) = 1 (as v(z1, 0, z3) = u1,2(z1, 0)+1 and thus v(z1, 0, z3) =
1). Hence (31) and (35) give
u2,3(y2, z3) = −1. (37)
By monotonicity, v(y1, y2, z3) = 1 (as v(y1, y2, 0) = u1,2(y1, y2) = 1). From (34) and
previous relation, we have
u1,3(y1, z3) = 1. (38)
• Assume then that z1 < y1. We have v(y1, 0, z3) = 1 by monotonicity of v (as
v(z1, 0, z3) = 1). Then (33) proves that (38) holds. This implies that (37) also
holds, thanks to (34).
By monotonicity, v(z1, y2, z3) = 1 (as v(z1, 0, z3) = 1). Hence (35) and (37) show
that (36) is satisfied.
In the two cases, we have proved that relations (36), (37) and (38) are true.
We make the following reasoning.
• We write
v(0, y2, z3) = u1,2(0, y2) + u1,3(0, z3)− 1
≥ v(0, y2, 0) = u1,2(0, y2)
Therefore u1,3(0, z3) ≥ 1. We also see that u1,3(0, z3) ∈ {0, 1} as v(0, 0, z3) =
u1,3(0, z3). Hence
u1,3(0, z3) = 1 (39)
v(0, 0, z3) = 1 (40)
• We write
v(0, y2, z3) = u1,2(0, y2) + u1,3(0, z3) + u2,3(y2, z3) = u1,2(0, y2)
≥ v(0, 0, z3) = 1
Hence
u1,2(0, y2) = 1. (41)
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• We have
v(0, y′2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity and (40)
= u1,3(0, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+u2,3(y
′
2, z3)
Hence
u2,3(y
′
2, z3) = 0. (42)
• We have
v(y′1, y
′
2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by monotonicity
= 1 + u1,3(y
′
1, z3) + u2,3(y
′
2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (42)
Hence
u1,3(y
′
1, z3) = 0. (43)
• Finally
v(y′1, y2, z3) = u1,2(y
′
1, y2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1 by (15) and (41)
+ u1,3(y
′
1, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by (43)
+ u2,3(y2, z3)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−1 by (37)
= 0
We obtain a contradiction as v(y′1, y2, z3) = 1 (thanks to monotonicity of v, and to
(40)).
A contradiction is raised in all situations. Hence it is not possible to have u1,3 non-zero,
knowing that u1,2 depends on its two variables.
Finally, we have proved that if u1,2 depends on its two variables, no other term can
be non-zero. This proves that u depends only on two variables.
In summary, we have proved that the extreme points of Pk,2 are the 2-additive 0-1-
valued k-ary capacities, and that these capacities have a support of size at most 2. It
follows that any v ∈ Pk,2 can be written as a convex combination of 2-additive k-ary
capacities with support of size at most 2, which proves Theorem 2.
4.3 Expression of the extreme points of the polytope of 2-
additive k-ary capacities
We are now in position to determine all vertices of Pk,2, for a fixed k ∈ N. By Theorem 4,
we know that any vertex has a support of at most two elements, hence w.l.o.g. we can
restrict to elements 1 and 2. By Theorem 3, finding all vertices with support {1, 2}
amounts to finding all 0-1 k-ary capacities which are linear combinations of unanimity
games ux with supp(x) ⊆ {1, 2}. By analogy with classical simple games, a coalition
x ∈ LN is winning for v if v(x) = 1. Minimal winning coalitions are those which are
minimal w.r.t. the order ≤ on LN , and therefore they form an antichain in LN . We show
several properties of minimal winning coalitions.
Lemma 7. Let µ be a 0-1-valued k-ary capacity.
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(i) x is a minimal winning coalition if and only if mµ(x) = 1 and mµ(y) = 0 for all
y < x.
(ii) supp(µ) ⊆ {1, 2} if and only if its minimal winning coalitions have support included
in {1, 2}.
(iii) If |supp(µ)| = 2, there are at most k + 1 distinct minimal winning coalitions.
(iv) Suppose that supp(µ) ⊆ {1, 2}. Denote by x1, . . . , xq the minimal winning coalitions
of µ, arranged such that x11 < x
2
1 · · · < x
q
1. Then m
µ(xℓ) = 1 for all ℓ = 1, . . . , q,
mµ(xℓ ∨ xℓ+1) = −1 for ℓ = 1, . . . , q − 1, and mµ(x) = 0 otherwise.
Proof. (i) Suppose mµ(x) = 1 and mµ(y) = 0 for all y < x. Then clearly x is a
minimal winning coalition. Conversely, suppose first that there exists y < x such
that mµ(y) 6= 0, and choose a minimal y with this property. Then µ(y) 6= 0,
a contradiction. Then, suppose there is no such y < x but mµ(x) 6= 1. Then
µ(x) = mµ(x) 6= 1, again a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose there exists a minimal winning coalition x such that supp(x) 6⊆ {1, 2}.
Then by (i), the support of µ is not included in {1, 2}.
Conversely, suppose that there exists x ∈ LN with mµ(x) 6= 0 and supp(x) 6⊆ {1, 2}.
Choose a minimal such x. By Lemma 3, mµ(x) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Observe that mµ(x) =
−1 is impossible, because this would yield µ(x) = −1. Then mµ(x) = 1 = µ(x),
proving by (i) that x is a minimal winning coalition.
(iii) Take x being a minimal winning coalition, and suppose w.l.o.g. that supp(x) ⊆
{1, 2}. Observe that any other minimal winning coalition y must satisfy x1 6= y1,
otherwise one of the two would not be minimal. Hence, there can be at most k+ 1
distinct minimal winning coalitions.
(iv) By uniqueness of the decomposition, it suffices to check that the computation of
µ by µ(x) =
∑
y≤xm
µ(y) works. By construction, any x ∈ LN is greater or equal
to a subset of consecutive minimal winning coalitions, say, xi+1, xi+2, . . . , xi+j , so
that there are j − 1 pairs (xi+ℓ, xi+ℓ+1), ℓ = 1, . . . , j − 1. The result follows by the
definition of mµ.
The various properties in the Lemma permit to say that the vertices of Pk,2 with
support included into {1, 2} are in bijection with the antichains (which are of size at
most k + 1) in the lattice (k + 1)2. Moreover, their Mo¨bius transform is known.
Lemma 8. Let k ∈ N. Denote by κ(ℓ) the number of antichains of ℓ elements in the
lattice (k + 1)2, ℓ = 1, . . . , k + 1. Then
κ(ℓ) =
(
k + 1
ℓ
)2
.
Moreover, the total number of antichains on (k + 1)2 is
k+1∑
ℓ=1
κ(ℓ) =
(
2k + 2
k + 1
)
− 1.
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Proof. Let x ∈ (k + 1)2, with coordinates (x1, x2). Considering that the 1st coordinate
axis is on the left, we say that y is on the left of x if y1 > x1 and y2 < x2. Let us denote
by F1(x1, x2) the number of points y to the left of x (i.e., {x, y} is an antichain). We
obtain
F1(x1, x2) =
x2−1∑
y2=0
k∑
y1=x1+1
1 = x2(k − x1).
Note that κ(1) = F1(−1, k + 1) since any point in (k + 1)
2 is to the left of (−1, k + 1).
Define F2(x1, x2) as the number of antichains {y, z} to the left of x, with z to the left
of y, i.e., {x, y, z} forms an antichain. We obtain
F2(x1, x2) =
x2−1∑
y2=1
k−1∑
y1=x1+1
F1(y1, y2).
(note that y2 = 0 and y1 = k are impossible because z is on the left of y). Again remark
that κ(2) = F2(−1, k+ 1). More generally, the number of antichains of ℓ elements to the
left of x is
Fℓ(x1, x2) =
x2−1∑
y2=ℓ−1
k−ℓ+1∑
y1=x1+1
Fℓ−1(y1, y2) (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k + 1),
and κ(ℓ) = Fℓ(−1, k + 1). We show by induction that
Fℓ(x1, x2) =
(
x2
ℓ
)(
k − x1
ℓ
)
. (44)
The result has already been verified for ℓ = 1. We assume it is true up to some integer
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ k and prove it for ℓ+ 1. We have
Fℓ+1(x1, x2) =
x2−1∑
y2=ℓ
k−ℓ∑
y1=x1+1
Fℓ(y1, y2)
=
x2−1∑
y2=ℓ
k−ℓ∑
y1=x1+1
(
y2
ℓ
)(
k − y1
ℓ
)
=
x2−1∑
y2=ℓ
(
y2
ℓ
) k−ℓ∑
y1=x1+1
(
k − y1
ℓ
)
=
(
x2
ℓ+ 1
)(
k − x1
ℓ+ 1
)
,
where we have used the fact that (see (Gradshteyn and Ryzhik, 2007, §0.151))
m∑
k=0
(
n+ k
n
)
=
(
n+m+ 1
n+ 1
)
.
Hence (44) is proved. It remains to compute the total number of antichains. Using the
fact that (see (Gradshteyn and Ryzhik, 2007, §0.157))
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)2
=
(
2n
n
)
,
we find the desired result.
21
Observing that the antichain {0} does not correspond to a normalized capacity, we
obtain directly from Lemma 8 and previous considerations the following result.
Theorem 5. Let k ∈ N and consider the polytope Pk,2. The following holds.
(i) For any i ∈ N , the number of vertices with support {i} is k.
(ii) For any distinct i, j ∈ N , the number of vertices with support included in {i, j} is(
2k + 2
k + 1
)
− 2.
(iii) The total number of vertices of Pk,2 is[(
2k + 2
k + 1
)
− 2− 2k
]
n(n− 1)
2
+ kn =
[(
2k + 2
k + 1
)
− 2
]
n(n− 1)
2
− kn(n− 2).
4.4 Significance of the main theorem
We have seen in Section 2.3 that the decomposition of a GAI model is not unique in
general, and moreover, nothing ensures that the terms of the decomposition have the
same type of monotonicity (see Example 1).
According to Theorem 2, any monotone 2-additive discrete GAI model can be rewrit-
ten using only nonnegative and monotone utility terms, which is not the case of the
canonical decomposition (see Example 1). Hence, using our decomposition, it is easy to
provide a semantics to each utility terms uS, so that the model can be easily interpreted
and displayed to the decision maker.
Theorem 2 brings also very important benefits during the elicitation of a GAI model.
It indeed reduces the representation of monotonicity constraints from exponential to
quadratic complexity. The aim of elicitation is to construct the parameters of the decision
model from preference information. Classically, preference information consists of a set of
pairwise comparisons among elements in X (for each pair (x, y) ∈ X2, the decision maker
strictly prefers x to y) or an assignment of elements in X to some predefined ordered
categories C1, . . . , Cm as in classification problems. There are mainly two elicitation
paradigms.
The first one is a constraint approach, where each pair (x, y) is transformed into a
linear constraint on the parameters of the GAI model (Greco et al., 2014; Bigot et al.,
2012; Labreuche and Grabisch, 2013). Monotonicity conditions can also be written as
linear constraints. The GAI model is then identified using Linear Programming. The
practical identification of the model appears to be rapidly computationally intractable as
the number of attributes and the cardinality of the attributes grow. Thanks to Theorem 2,
these constraints can be replaced by monotonicity conditions on each term uS in the GAI
decomposition, which reduces the number of monotonicity constraints from exponential
to quadratic in the number of criteria. This permits to solve problems of much larger
size.
Within a constraint approach, robust methods are appealing as they consider all
parameters values fulfilling the previous constraints, rather than arbitrarily selecting one
of these values. MinMax Regret criterion is a conservative way to handle the uncertainty
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on the decision model (Boutilier et al., 2006). The idea is to set bounds on the worst
possible loss one could have by choosing an alternative, looking at the set of possible
parameters values. It is interesting to note that the scientific community that developped
these approaches does not enforce monotonicity conditions. This makes the elicitation
quite complex, as one needs to provide a lot of preference information to obtain the correct
monotonicity conditions. Most applications in this area consider a very small size of S
compared to the number of criteria, which is not always possible in practice. One would
then expect a great benefit of enforcing monotonicity conditions in the MinMax Regret
method. Here again, Theorem 2 is very helpful as it reduces the number of monotonicity
conditions to a tractable number.
Methods of the second paradigm are statistical. One can mention as an example
the extension of Logistic Regression to utility models incorporating interaction among
criteria (Fallah Tehrani et al., 2012, 2014). Here the preference information is put into
the function to optimize, and the global problem to solve is often a convex problem
under linear constraints, mostly monotonicity conditions. The number of monotonicity
conditions highly influences the efficiency of the optimization algorithm. This shows
again the importance of Theorem 2.
5 Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that it is always possible to write a 2-additive discrete
GAI model as a sum of nonnegative and monotone nondecreasing terms, thus reducing
the complexity of any optimization problem involving such models from exponential to
quadratic complexity in the number of attributes. We believe that this result opens the
way to the practical utilization of GAI models.
By the equivalence between 2-additive discrete GAI models and 2-additive k-ary ca-
pacities, as a by-product of our main result, we have obtained all extreme points of the
polytope of 2-additive k-ary capacities, a result which is new, as far as we know, and
which generalizes the results of Miranda et al. (2006) for classical 2-additive capacities.
A Mo¨bius transform of a k-ary capacity
The result can be easily obtained by using standard results of the theory of Mo¨bius
functions (see, e.g., Aigner (1979)). Given a finite poset (partially ordered set) (P,≤),
its Mo¨bius function µ : P × P → R is defined inductively by:
µ(x, y) =


1, if x = y
−
∑
x≤t<y µ(x, t), if x < y
0, otherwise
.
Then the solution of the system f(x) =
∑
y≤x g(y), x ∈ P , is given by
g(x) =
∑
y≤x
µ(y, x)f(y) (x ∈ P ),
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and g is called the Mo¨bius transform (or inverse) of f . Note that in the case of capacities,
(P,≤) is taken as (2N ,⊆).
Considering two posets (P,≤), (P ′,≤′), and the product poset (P × P ′,≤) where ≤
is the product order, i.e., (x, y) ≤ (x′, y′) if x ≤ x′ and y ≤′ y′, it is easy to show that the
Mo¨bius function on P × P ′ is the product of the Mo¨bius functions on P and P ′:
µ((x, t), (y, z)) = µP (x, y)µP ′(t, z) (x, y ∈ P, t, z ∈ P
′).
Let us apply this result to k-ary capacities. It is easy to see that the Mo¨bius function on
the chain {0, 1, . . . , k} is given by
µ{0,1,...,k}(x, y) =
{
(−1)y−x, if 0 ≤ y − x ≤ 1
0, otherwise.
(45)
It follows that the Mo¨bius transform mv of a k-ary capacity v is given by
mv(x) =
∑
y≤x:xi−yi≤1∀i∈N
(−1)
∑
i∈N (xi−yi)v(y).
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